DOCKET NO.: TCS-0008 PATENT

Application No.: 10/620,156

Office Action Dated: December 4, 2008

REMARKS

Explanation of Amendments

Claims 3, 5, 8, 11, 19, 20, 22, and 27 have been amended for clarification. No new matter has been entered. Upon entry of the above amendments, claims 3, 5-12, and 19-28 and will remain pending.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §103

Claims 3, 6, 7, 9, 21-24, and 28 stand rejected under 35 USC §103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable as obvious over Cheriton (US 7,120,931) in view of Vaidya (US 6,279,113). Claims 5 and 8 stand rejected under 35 USC §103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable as obvious over Cheriton and Vaidya in view of Desai et al. (US 2003/0188189). Claims 10, 12, and 25 stand rejected under 35 USC §103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable as obvious over Cheriton and Vaidya in view of Daizo (US 6,424,654). Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 USC §103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable as obvious over Cheriton, Vaidya, and Daizo in view of Desai et al. Claims 19 and 26 stands rejected under 35 USC §103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable as obvious over Cheriton and Vaidya in view of Trcka et al. (US 6,453,345). Finally, claims 20 and 27 stand rejected under 35 USC §103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable as obvious over Cheriton and Vaidya in view of Ullmann et al. (US 2002/0174362). These rejections are respectfully traversed.

The claimed system and method for detecting surveillance probes on a computer communications network to alert sites to possible imminent intrusions by detecting the system surveillance (or scanning) that often precedes such attacks. For example, surveillance probes are used to gather information including whether hosts are alive, what services they are running, whether they are running a particular vulnerable application, etc. The claimed system and method exploits the fact that someone attempting to gather information about an enterprise to attack does not know what information they are attempting to gather, and because of that, they make mistakes. Almost all legitimate protocols on the IP Internet are query response type protocols, which means that both parties send packets to each other. Accordingly, the potential intruder must probe hosts in an attempt to gather information to determine when and where to attack the system.

DOCKET NO.: TCS-0008 **Application No.:** 10/620,156

Office Action Dated: December 4, 2008

The claimed system and method may exploit the fact that surveillance probes often receive no response or the response is an error message since the surveillance probes do not necessarily know what information they seek. In other words, by tracking the initiator of "bad" connections, the attacking source(s) may be identified. For example, when one IP source is responsible for too many unique bad connections within a specified time interval, an alert is raised. A "bad" connection may be defined very simply as any IP communication which does not generate any kind of valid reply. If one IP source racks up enough of these "bad" (or unreplied) connections to unique destinations, it is considered to be possibly surveying the network and an alert is raised. If it continues to send probes, further alerts will occur.

The claimed system and method accomplished this result by assembling data packets into "connection sessions" and deciding whether they are from "good" or "bad" sources. Assembling packets into connections is done by storing information about the connection in a memory so as to uniquely identify a particular connection. For example, the stored information may include statistics on source IP address that initiate probes over long periods of time (see e.g. specification at paragraph [0051]). Applicant notes that the definitions of "source" and "destination" as used herein are from the perspective of the originator of the connection, where the source refers to information about the client and destination refers to information about the server. Thus, when a packet travels from the client to the server, the sources and destinations observed in the packet are the same as the connection sources and destinations. However, for packets traveling from the server to the client, the observed packet sources and destination are actually reversed.

The claimed system and method determines directionality by considering one packet in relation to any other packets which it has seen before for the same connection identification. In practice, the surveillance detector uses the first packet observed in a connection as an indication of the directionality of the connection. For example, as noted in paragraph [0070] of the specification, flag fields in the connection extrapolator may record from which direction interesting events, such as a first packet, initiate. In other words, the system and method uses timing-based directionality, meaning that the first packet determines the connection source. All subsequent packets match the existing entry in the connection table and may simply update any necessary information from that table.

DOCKET NO.: TCS-0008 **Application No.:** 10/620,156

Office Action Dated: December 4, 2008

In order to perform the necessary good/bad connection tracking (where, e.g., "good" connections have bidirectional traffic and "bad" connections have unidirectional traffic), in addition to recording whether the low address is the connection source or destination, the system also tracks whether it has seen a connection from both the connection source and destination (or as illustrated in paragraphs [0069]-[0070] of the specification, whether the system has seen the connection from the low or high addresses). Other information, such as the number of packets observed, or the number of bytes of payload, and similar aggregate statistics about features of the packet can also be accumulated in the connection sessions. These aggregate statistics may be of use to the surveillance detector or users of the surveillance detection alerts. When sufficient bad evidence has built up regarding a connection, the system can generate an alert summarizing the bad activity.

These characteristic features of the method are set forth in claim 3. In particular, claims 3 recites a method of detecting surveillance probes on a computer communications network, comprising:

receiving a plurality of messages from a data sensor located at a network audit point, said data sensor sampling data packets on said computer communications network and outputting said messages, each of said messages describing an event occurring on said communications network;

processing said messages to form extrapolated connection sessions from said sampled data packets from which to determine a connection source for each message by clustering packets a) exchanged between two addresses within a specified time period where the addresses are not predetermined, (b) having certain flags set, or c) having addresses that are not predetermined but have similar characteristics; and

detecting a surveillance probe by:

grouping said connection sessions into a plurality of groups of related connection source addresses;

scoring each group based on at least a quantity of attack destinations; and

generating an alert for each group whose score is greater than an empirically derived threshold.

Similar features may be found in system claim 22. Such features are not shown or suggested by the cited prior art. In particular, Applicant submits that the cited are does not enable the system to establish who initiates the connection, namely, who the connection

PATENT

DOCKET NO.: TCS-0008 **Application No.:** 10/620,156

Office Action Dated: December 4, 2008

source is, as opposed to the packet source. Systems like that of Cheriton, which detects "flow data," cannot perform this connection identification since the received flow data does not have sufficiently precise information to establish who initiated the connection. Also, the cited art does not detect a surveillance probe based on scoring whether or not the packets in response to a query indicate successful communication from the network protocol perspective or indicate attack destinations and then generate an alert if a threshold is exceeded as claimed.

As noted in the previous response, Cheriton discloses a system and method for analyzing high speed data entering a router or firewall to identify detailed characteristics of the packets involved in an attack or a failure. The method includes generating filters based on analyzed flow data by separating the data into different network flows, analyzing at least one of the network flows, and detecting potentially harmful network flows. A filter is generated to prevent packets corresponding to the detected potentially harmful network flows from passing through the network device. As illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, a netflow mechanism processes each packet in the network flow responsive to the entry for the network flow in the flow cache, and the netflow mechanism implements administrative policies that are designated for each network flow rather than for each packet. The network flows are analyzed and information on incoming packets is provided without examining each packet received. This "flow collection aggregation" allows for data to be stored by aggregate summary records instead of raw data records (column 6, lines 56-65). Once a group of packets is identified as harmful, the corresponding network flows may be analyzed to further refine the filter. The flow analyzer monitors the statistics associated with the aggregate filters and, if the statistics associated with an aggregate filter entry indicate a potential problem, creation of netflow entries is enabled for packets matching the entry. The flow analyzer receives a flow record for each flow matching the aggregate, and the flow generator determines how to refine the aggregate filter.

In contrast with the claimed method, Cheriton's analysis of the flow data does not enable Cheriton's system to "form extrapolated connection sessions from said sampled data packets from which to determine a connection source for each message" as claimed. On the contrary, those skilled in the art will appreciate that the flow data of Cheriton are not connections and thus cannot form "connection sessions" as now claimed. The flow data analyzed by Cheriton is more like half connections since the flow data is extracted from a

DOCKET NO.: TCS-0008 **Application No.:** 10/620,156

Office Action Dated: December 4, 2008

unidirectional traffic flow. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the claimed "connection sessions" instead involve bidirectional flows of data where the connection source (client) and connection destination (server) are known. Since the flow data from a router/switch analyzed by Cheriton does not include sufficient information to permit one to accurately distinguish the connection client and server by, for example, assembling flow data into "connection session," and since Cheriton provides no teachings regarding "determining a connection source for each message," the claimed method and system are not suggested by Cheriton. Moreover, since Cheriton does not sample the network data but instead processes the entire network flow, no "extrapolated connection sessions" are generated as claimed.

Furthermore, as acknowledged by the Examiner, Cheriton does not score each group or generate an alert for each group whose score is greater than an empirically derived threshold. For a teaching of scoring each group and generating an alert for each group whose score is greater than an empirically derived threshold, the Examiner references Vaidya's teachings of counting characteristics in the packet stream, such as an attempt to access a file, and determining whether the count exceeds a threshold. However, Vaidya does not teach detecting a surveillance probe by grouping connection sessions into a plurality of groups of related connection source addresses and scoring each group "based on at least a quantity of attack destinations" as now claimed. Applicant further submits that Vaidya does not teach the above-mentioned features that are not taught by Cheriton. Accordingly, even if the teachings of Vaidya could have been combined with the teachings of Cheriton as the Examiner alleges, the claimed system and method would not have resulted. Withdrawal of the rejection of independent claims 3 and 22 is thus solicited.

Desai et al., Daizo, Trcka et al., and Ullmann et al. have been cited by the Examiner with respect to particular features of the dependent claims. Applicant submits that none of these patent documents teaches the afore-mentioned features of claim 3 that are not taught by Cheriton or Vaidya. Accordingly, even if the teachings of one or more of these references would have been combined with the teachings of Cheriton and Vaidya as the Examiner alleges, the features of claim 3 still would not have been suggested to one skilled in the art.

For at least the foregoing reasons, claim 3 and the claims dependent thereon (claims 5-12 and 19-21) are believed to be allowable over all of the cited references in any proposed

DOCKET NO.: TCS-0008 PATENT

Application No.: 10/620,156

Office Action Dated: December 4, 2008

combination. Moreover, new claims 22-28 are believed to be allowable for the same reasons as claim 3. Allowance of claims 3, 5-12, and 19-28 is solicited.

Conclusion

Claims 3, 5-12, and 19-28 are believed to be novel and non-obvious over the cited references. Withdrawal of all rejections and issuance of a Notice of Allowability are solicited.

Date: April 3, 2009 /Michael P. Dunnam/

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